Contract Manager — demo tour Sign in to the app →
RELEX Solutions · Contract Manager

Every contract, seen only by the people who should see it.

A guided walkthrough of the RELEX Contract Manager — moving RELEX's customer subscription contracts out of a shared SharePoint where everyone could see everything, into a system scoped by each account executive's Salesforce book of business. This tour follows one realistic day, screen by screen.

1,032 contracts 145 customer accounts · NA / UK&I / EU / Nordics 15 people · 5 roles Access scoped by Salesforce ownership
Demonstration built for RELEX Solutions, in the RELEX visual language. The company, people, accounts, and contract values shown are illustrative sample data — not real contracts. Every screen below mirrors the working application running on that data.
01

The problem we're solving

Today, the retailer's contracts live in a shared SharePoint folder. Permissions there broke down long ago — inheritance was overridden site by site until, in practice, everyone can open everything: a UK rep can read a US customer's confidential pricing, and nobody can prove who looked at what. Nothing watches renewal dates or price-increase clauses, so contracts quietly auto-renew on stale terms and entitled increases go untaken.

SharePointeveryone
  • Confidential pricing — visible to all
  • Other regions' contracts — open
  • Who viewed what — not tracked
  • Renewal deadlines — unwatched
Contract Managerscoped & audited
  • You see a contract because its account is in your Salesforce book
  • Restricted agreements need an explicit grant — even for read-all roles
  • Every view, download and edit is logged
  • Notice deadlines & price adjustments are tracked and alerted
Why

The whole product is one idea: access follows the Salesforce relationship. A person sees the contracts for the accounts they own or sit on the team for — nothing more — and that rule is enforced in one place, on every single query.

02

Alice, a US rep, signs in

Alice Chen is a RELEX account executive; she owns roughly a dozen customer accounts in Salesforce. When she opens her contract list, the system quietly joins her login to her Salesforce user, resolves the accounts in her book, and shows only those contracts94 of the 1,032 in the system. She never sees a control that hints the other 938 exist.

localhost/clm/index.php?page=contracts Alice Chen · rep
Contracts1–6 of 94
TitleAccountTypeStatusNotice deadlineValue
Greenfield Grocers — Master Supply Agreement 2026Greenfield Grocersmsaactive2026-11-04$480,000
MetroMart Stores — Master Services AgreementMetroMart Storesmsaactive2027-03-04$1,250,000
MetroMart Stores — SOW: In-Store Analytics RolloutMetroMart Storessowactive2026-08-13 · 7d$60,000
MetroMart Stores — Amendment No. 1 (Volume Rebate)MetroMart Storesamendmentactive2027-03-04$150,000
RheinWare GmbH — Supply & Logistics AgreementRheinWare GmbHmsaactive2027-09-20€410,000
RheinWare GmbH — Renewal Addendum 2026RheinWare GmbHrenewalactive2028-06-01€90,000

A slice of Alice's 94-contract book. The other 938 contracts — every colleague's accounts — are absent, not just hidden behind a filter.

Note

Alice owns RheinWare, a German account — the retailer is multinational, so values carry their own currency (USD, EUR, GBP) and are never mixed together.

03

The same door, six different views

This is the heart of it. Every person opens the exact same page — and the system shows each of them a different, correct slice. A rep sees their book; their manager sees the union of the reps they manage; legal, finance and executives see the whole portfolio — except restricted agreements, which stay locked even to read-all roles until access is explicitly granted.

Ben Okafor · rep5
  • BritMart (UK) — owner
  • EuroFresh (FR) — owner
  • RheinWare — on the account team
  • Alice's Greenfield / MetroMart
Carla Ruiz · manager9
  • Everything Alice sees
  • + everything Ben sees
  • Restricted addendum — still locked
  • Accounts outside her team
Finn Morgan · finance13
  • All accounts, all regions
  • Restricted addendum — granted to Finn
  • Owns the price-increase pipeline
Dana Whitfield · legal13
  • Sees & edits everything, restricted included
  • Runs the migration review queue
Evelyn Cross · exec12
  • Whole portfolio, read-only
  • Restricted addendum — hidden (no grant)
Alice · the restricted one
  • Greenfield Confidential Pricing Addendum
  • Hidden even from Alice, who owns the account
  • Only legal + explicitly granted users
The rule that surprises people

A restricted contract is hidden even from the rep who owns the account and even from executives. Confidentiality overrides the ordinary book-of-business rule — only legal, or someone explicitly granted, can open it. That's how a sensitive pricing addendum stays sensitive.

04

Opening a contract

Alice clicks into the MetroMart Master Services Agreement. She sees the structured record — parties, dates, renewal terms, value — the version history of the PDF, its amendment chain, and any notes. The PDF itself is streamed through an authenticated gate: even the file's web address is useless to anyone not allowed to see the contract.

localhost/clm/index.php?page=contract&id=58 Alice Chen · rep
MetroMart Stores — Master Services Agreementactive

Contract details

AccountMetroMart Stores
Typemsa
Effective2025-01-01
Expires2027-06-02
Renewalauto · 12 mo
Notice period90 days
Notice deadline2027-03-04
Value$1,250,000 USD
Governing lawDelaware
Confidentialitystandard

Files & chain

📄 MSA-2025-signed.pdfv2
📄 MSA-2025-draft.pdfv1

Amendment chain

↳ Amendment No. 1 (Volume Rebate)

Notes

"Rebate tiers confirmed with MetroMart procurement, Jul 2026."
Security

Files live outside the web root and are served only through a permission check. Ask for a file you're not allowed to see and the answer is an indistinguishable "not found" — the system never even confirms the document exists.

05

The renewal that won't slip through

Most tools alert you when a contract expires — by then it's too late, because an auto-renewing contract already rolled over when the cancellation window closed. Contract Manager tracks the date that actually matters: the notice deadline — expiry minus the notice period — and warns on a 90 / 60 / 30 / 7-day ladder, escalating to managers and legal if nobody acts.

localhost/clm/index.php?page=clm_dashboard Alice Chen · rep
Alerts — action needed● 3 unacknowledged
WhenWhatContractFires in
2026-08-13notice deadlineMetroMart — SOW: In-Store Analytics Rollout7 days
2026-08-13price adjustmentMetroMart — Master Services Agreement7 days
2026-09-05expirationBritMart — Mutual NDA (no renewal)30 days
2026-11-04notice deadlineGreenfield — Master Supply Agreement 202690 days
2026-08-06annual reviewEuroFresh — Distribution Agreement (evergreen)today

Generated by the nightly alert engine from the real contract dates — idempotent, so re-running never double-sends.

Why it matters

The MetroMart SOW auto-renews. Its 30-day cancellation window closes on Aug 13 — not when it expires. Alice gets seven days' warning to decide, instead of discovering next year that it renewed on last year's rate.

06

Finding money left on the table

Finn, in finance, opens the price-increase pipeline. Many contracts allow an annual CPI-linked increase — but tracking dozens of clauses with different dates by hand means increases quietly get missed. The pipeline surfaces every contract whose adjustment date has passed with no increase applied: entitled money nobody has claimed.

localhost/clm/index.php?page=prices Finn Morgan · finance
Price Increase PipelineOpportunities · Notified · Applied
OpportunityAccountIndexAdjustment dueCapCurrent value
Greenfield Grocers — Master Supply Agreement 2026 Greenfield Grocers CPI 2026-07-27 · overdue 5% $480,000 Notify

One opportunity in the demo set — a real query: adjustment date ≤ today, and no notified/applied/skipped increase on record.

The workflow

Finn moves each opportunity through Notify → Apply. On apply, the system records the percentage and old→new value, updates the contract, and rolls the next adjustment date forward a year — so the clock restarts automatically and the same money is never missed twice.

07

Migrating the old files — with AI doing the typing

The thousands of PDFs in SharePoint don't have structured data — just documents. Rather than have legal hand-key every field, the system reads each PDF and uses AI to extract the metadata into a review queue. Legal sees the document and the proposed fields side by side, with a confidence score on each. They confirm or correct — nothing goes live without a human — and approve.

localhost/clm/index.php?page=review_queue&id=66 Dana Whitfield · legal
Review queue — MetroMart-SOW-scan.pdfneeds review

Source document

page 1 / 4

MASTER SERVICES AGREEMENT

Extracted — confirm or correct

Counterparty
MetroMart Stores Inc.
"…including MetroMart Stores Inc."
0.93
Expiration
2027-12-31
0.90
Renewal
auto
0.90
Notice period
90 days
0.90
Value
$180,000
"annual fee of USD 180,000"
0.72
Index cap %
5%
0.65
Notice for adj.
30 days
"at least 30 days before any adjustment"
0.50
Flag for manualApprove → active

Real AI output from the demo data. Amber scores (< 0.6) flag fields the reviewer should check first.

Human in the loop

The suggested Salesforce account is pre-selected, high-confidence fields are pre-filled, and low-confidence ones are highlighted amber. Legal's judgement is the gate — a contract only becomes active when a person approves it.

08

The dashboard, and the paper trail

Everyone lands on a dashboard scoped to their slice: what's expiring, what needs a decision, and the portfolio totals — kept per currency, never summed across. And behind it all, legal has a complete audit log: every view, download, edit and approval, by whom and when — the record SharePoint never kept.

localhost/clm/index.php?page=clm_dashboard Evelyn Cross · executive
Portfolio dashboardread-only
1,000
Contracts visible
47
Live alerts
43
Price opportunities
32
In migration review

Portfolio value — grouped by currency (never mixed)

USD$120.4M
EUR€82.7M
GBP£33.1M
NOKkr 7.9M
SEKkr 3.3M
localhost/clm/index.php?page=audit Dana Whitfield · legal
Audit loglegal oversight
WhenWhoActionContractIP
2026-08-06 09:14alice.chencontract.viewMetroMart — MSA10.2.14.5
2026-08-06 09:15alice.chenfile.downloadMetroMart — MSA v210.2.14.5
2026-08-06 10:02finn.morganprice.notifiedGreenfield — MSA 202610.2.7.9
2026-08-06 11:38dana.legalreview.approveMetroMart — SOW (migrated)10.2.3.1
2026-08-06 11:40ben.okaforfile.denied— (not permitted)10.9.1.2
The record

The last line matters: Ben tried to open a file he isn't permitted to see, and the system logged the denial. Nothing happens to a contract without a name and a timestamp attached to it.

09

Verifying it — "view as" any user

"How do I know a rep can't see the wrong contracts?" Dana, in legal, doesn't take it on faith. From the admin screen she picks any person and enters view-only impersonation — the whole application re-renders as exactly what that user sees. A persistent banner makes the mode unmistakable, and while it's active every edit, approval and price action is disabled: she can look, but nothing can happen under someone else's name. Starting and stopping are both written to the audit log.

localhost/clm/index.php?page=contracts Dana Whitfield · legal
● Viewing as Alice Chen (rep) — you are Dana Whitfield. Actions are disabled. Stop viewing
Contracts1–6 of 94 · Alice's book
TitleAccountTypeStatusValue
Greenfield Grocers — Master Subscription Agreement 2024Greenfield Grocersmsaactive$480,000
MetroMart Stores — Order Form: Demand ForecastingMetroMart Storesrenewalactive$1,250,000
RheinWare GmbH — Order Form: ReplenishmentRheinWare GmbHsowactive€410,000
…91 more — exactly Alice's book, nothing else

Dana sees precisely what Alice sees — 94 contracts, not the full 1,032 — because the scoping is driven by Alice's identity, not Dana's read-all role. The amber bar and disabled actions are always on while viewing.

Why view-only

Impersonation is for seeing, never acting. The system re-checks the real admin's own privilege on every request — a copied or tampered session can't grant it — and blocks every write, so the audit trail can never show Alice doing something Dana actually did. It's the cleanest way to confirm the access model is behaving, and to support a user by seeing exactly what they see.

Behind this tour is a working application. The same RELEX sample data is loaded in the running Contract Manager, where you can sign in as any of the fifteen people — Alice (account exec), Finn (finance), Dana (legal), and the rest — and watch each door open onto a different, correct view. Legal can "view as" anyone to verify it. Every screen above mirrors that live app.